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Synthetic Biology and Ethics: A Biosecurity Argument 
 
Marko Ahteensuu 
Division of Philosophy, Royal Institute of Technology, University of Turku (Sweden) 
 
Synthetic biology–i.e. an engineering-based modelling and building approach to biology–holds 
promise for a number of practical applications in fields such as medicine, energy production, material 
technology, and bioremediation. At the same time, synthetic biology raises a welter of ethical issues. It 
has become customary to group them into two categories: Intrinsic concerns embody the idea that 
(specific) research on and/or practical applications of synthetic biology are morally questionable 
because of some feature of (the use of) the technology in itself, irrespective of its consequences. 
Questions of this type include, for example, the following. Does constructing new forms of life cross 
moral boundaries of playing god, unnaturalness or human hubris? According to extrinsic concerns, 
(specific) research on and/or practical applications of synthetic biology are morally questionable 
because of their (known and possible) consequences. Following questions belong to this group: Does 
“creating” new kinds of organisms and species change the way we perceive nature and ourselves? Does 
the use of synthetic biology result in unjust distributions in society? Besides these, intrinsic concerns 
also involve worries about possible harmful consequences to human health, animals and the 
environment. Here it has become standard to talk about the management of two kinds of risks. On the 
one hand, biosafety refers to principles, practices and specific actions taken to prevent possible 
unintended and unexpected consequences. Laboratory facility requirements and protection measures in 
relation to four classes (risk groups) of pathogenic microorganisms provide an example. On the other 
hand, biosecurity refers to principles, practices and specific actions taken to prevent intentional misuse 
of synthetic biology. This forms a continuum ranging from mere “bionuisance” to bioterrorism and to 
biological war. 
 
I begin with pointing out that ethical questions that are highly similar to those of synthetic 
biology have been extensively discussed before in the context of gene ethics and the ethics of new 
technologies. It is in fact a matter of disagreement whether there is anything new, ethically speaking, in 
synthetic biology. I will argue, however, that at least biosecurity considerations pertaining to synthetic 
biology are to some extent new. I will highlight differences in response to “synbiosecurity” in the United 
States (US) and the European Union (EU), and discuss possible reasons for why in the US biosecurity 
concerns related to synthetic biology have received more attention in media and by regulators than in 
the EU. This is followed by an analysis of a biosecurity argument, the core of which is explicated below. 
It turns out that the general argument–as it is often stated in the literature and discussions–needs to be 
qualified, and that many improvements to biosecurity have already been implemented, mainly as self-
governance of research and industry. Furthermore, I suggest a new specific strand of the argument: as 
synthetic biology falls under gene technology regulation in the EU, the divergence in biosecurity 
considerations (when compared to those of gene technology) provides a reason to review and possibly 
make refinements to the legislation as well as administrative and supervisory practices in the EU. 
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Ethical Issues and Medical Error: Preparing for the Unknown 
 
Shirley Bach 
Western Michigan University, Center for the Study of Ethics in Society 
Homer Stryker M.D. School of Medicine 
 
The publication in 1999 of the Institute of Medicine report, “To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health 
System” was a most significant event which galvanized both the medical profession and the public to 
deal constructively with medical error. It stimulated public discussion as well as institutional and 
professional reflection, with regard to our dedication to prevent medical errors and to deal 
constructively and ethically when medical errors do occur.  Only a short time earlier, there were 
significant disclosures in the press of wrong site surgeries and fatal medication errors in clinical practice 
and research, and these disclosures added to the dedication to address the magnitude of the problem.  
 
As professionals, we asked how we ought to respond to the current increased concern in enhancing 
patient safety and reducing medical error?  In addition, we addressed the ethical basis for this response 
on a personal, institutional, and professional society level. 
 
Since we have a professional duty to benefit patients and reduce harm whenever possible, we have, at 
the very least, a moral obligation to incorporate the techniques already in existence in order to reduce 
errors. In addition, it was felt that we should consider our obligation to go beyond what is already 
known and support research in new methodologies aimed at enhancing patient safety. 
 
When errors do occur, we must develop an ethically defensible approach to dealing with them. Respect 
for patients finds expression in telling the truth, in being honest with patients. Trust in the healthcare 
system, and certainly trust in our physicians, is founded on the expectation of honesty and the belief 
that the physician is working in the patient’s best interest. There is also an expectation that when 
patients are injured, we owe them or their families a prompt and full disclosure. Patients want an 
honest explanation and, if appropriate, an apology. Furthermore many patients have said that it is 
important that others not be harmed in the same way and therefore they should be informed that the 
factors involved in the injury will be investigated in order to reduce the likelihood of a similar injury to 
future patients.  
 
The Roman god, Janus, looks forward and backwards also. If we have made significant recent progress in 
reducing harm to patients, medical professionals are now looking at where the need appears greatest in 
the future. One area which warrants increased attention is the need to address the magnitude of 
patient harm from diagnostic error. This particular concern looms large when considering the 
extraordinary possibilities of increased genomic research and decisions that must be made as 
personalized medicine becomes more of a reality. Another area of ethical concern is the necessity to 
address the importance for timely and appropriate apology, as well as the offer of appropriate 
compensation, if patients have been harmed. 
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The Voice is As Mighty as the Pen: Integrating Conversations into Advance Care 
Planning Policies 
 
Kunal Bailoor 
University of Michigan Medical School 
 
Advance care planning allows patients to reflect upon and articulate their preferences with 
regard to their medical treatment, lifestyle, and surrogate decision makers in order to anticipate and 
mitigate their potential loss of decision making capacity. Ideally, advance care planning is a dynamic 
process in which patients analyze their preferences regarding medical interventions, goals of care, and 
quality of life and communicate these preferences to their healthcare providers. Written advance 
directives are often emphasized in this regard. These written statements of preferences may take many 
forms, including designation of a surrogate decision maker, living wills containing written statements of 
preference, Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) orders, and heath care proxies.  While these contain important 
information, there are several barriers to consider: veracity and accuracy of surrogate decision-makers 
making choices consistent with the substituted judgment standard, state to state variability in 
regulations, literacy issues, lack of access to legal resources, and cultural inadequacies. These barriers 
can often prevent vulnerable patient populations from making use of these written statements of 
preference. In addition, patient preferences are dynamic with time and health status. Given these 
issues, it is vital to increase our use of patient and healthcare provider conversations as an advance care 
planning tool, and to increase integration of such discourse into advance care planning policy as 
adjuncts and complements to written advance directives. We refer specifically to clinician-patient 
conversations that are subsequently documented in the patient’s progress notes, which we refer to as 
“documented interactions.” This paper reviews current national and state laws with regards to written 
advance directives and dissects how documentation of these verbal interactions can help patients faced 
with legal barriers. We discuss specific changes made our institution as a potential model to illustrate 
challenges related to implementation. Finally, we explore the ethical issues surrounding the increased 
usage and recognition of clinician-patient conversations in advanced care planning including whether 
written orders and documented conversations should be considered equivalently; whether documented 
interactions can be used for pediatric patients; and the potential issues with bias inherent to medical 
documentation. 
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Bioethics Training for Front Line Medical Providers and Staff: Legal and Ethical Issues 
 
Emily Bergquist, Master of Science in Administration Program, Central Michigan University, and Daniel 
LoBello, Western Michigan University Cooley Law School 
 
Emily Elder, Master of Science in Administration Program, Central Michigan University, and Christopher 
Marker, Western Michigan University Cooley Law School 
 
Kineta Sadler, Master of Science in Administration Program, Central Michigan 
University, and Holliann Willekes, Western Michigan University Cooley Law School 
 
Chair: Julie Janeway, Western Michigan University Cooley Law School 
 
Panel summary: Each law student will be paired with a front line medical provider or staff 
member.  The moderator will introduce the topic and structure of the presentation.  Each front line 
individual will briefly discuss bioethics issues she has encountered personally, and situations that are 
encountered commonly by providers and staff other than nurses or physicians.  Examples of issues 
include conflicting morals and values among care teams, intersection of personal morality and 
technology among front line providers, allocation of quality healthcare resources to those considered 
undeserving or unworthy, patient autonomy and listening to and respecting patient requests and 
requirements, and issues of patient safety and prevention of medical error, among others, and their 
intersection with the ethical principles of medicine and health law.  
Each accompanying law student will discuss the legal and ethical issues that may result from the 
lack of bioethics training for this segment of the health care worker population.  The panelists and 
moderator will then present a model protocol and training module curriculum for adoption by health 
care organizations regarding bioethics and legal issue training for health care providers and 
administrative staff.  Following the panelists’ presentation of the material, the presentation will be 
opened for questions from the audience.  Panelists will answer questions posed, and the moderator will 
augment where necessary. 
 
Patient Understanding and Satisfaction Regarding the Clinical Use of Whole Genome Sequencing: 
Findings from the Medseq Project 
 
Archana D. Bharadwaj 
Department of Health Behavior and Health Education, University of Michigan School of Public Health 
 
The development of new techniques has reduced the time and cost of Whole Genome 
Sequencing (WGS), and the resulting increase in availability of genetic testing has generated excitement 
due its potential to tailor medical treatment. However, the integration of WGS into clinical practice 
poses challenges for informed consent and disclosure of test results. Few empirical studies have 
examined patients’ understanding of and satisfaction with the clinical communication of WGS results in 
contexts outside of specialty cancer care such primary care and cardiology. 
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The MedSeq Project is a randomized clinical trial examining the impacts of WGS in two contexts: 
general genomic medicine, modeled through the use of primary care patients, representing the use of 
WGS as a preventative measure and disease-specific genome medicine, modeled through the use of 
cardiomyopathy patients, representing the use of WGS to examine genomic causes for conditions in 
there is a family history. We analyzed survey data from two time points: 1) patients’ initial enrollment 
and 2) immediately following disclosure of sequencing results by a physician. Domains of interest 
included understanding of informed consent, subjective understanding, satisfaction with 
communication of results, and decisional regret. Surveys included both validated (e.g., decisional regret) 
and novel (e.g., understanding of informed consent) self-report measures. 
 
Survey responses were provided by 202 participants (mean age = 55 years; 51% male; 80% 
college graduates). At enrollment, participants understood the majority of key facts about the study 
(mean = 19.6 / 22 items (89%) answered correctly), although some participants incorrectly answered 
items addressing results to be returned (e.g., 18% believed they would receive their entire DNA 
sequence) and potential risks to genetic privacy (e.g., 14% did not recognize how widely their data 
would be shared). Higher informed consent knowledge scores were associated with female gender, 
greater genomic knowledge, higher subjective numeracy, and higher education levels (all p < .05). After 
results disclosure, participants had low scores of regret regarding decision to participate in the study 
(mean score = 10/100 at results disclosure); they also reported high levels of satisfaction with their 
physicians’ disclosure of results (mean = 5.9 on a 6-point scale), although ~20% of participants reported 
receiving “too much” information. Satisfaction with communication did not vary by participants’ 
demographics or other characteristics (e.g. genomic knowledge). 
 
This study of the clinical application of genome sequencing in medicine suggests that the 
intervention was generally well understood by patients, with low levels of decisional regret and high 
levels of satisfaction with the communication of sequencing results. Future research will be necessary to 
examine these issues in more diverse samples of patients (e.g., with broader ranges of health literacy), 
where misconceptions about the clinical use of sequencing identified here may be more pronounced 
and patient concerns about information overload may be magnified. 
 
 
Embracing the Chiaroscuro: Rethinking Ambiguity in the Medical Treatment of 
Transgender Youth 
 
Lauren Baker 
Albert Gnaegi Center for Health Care Ethics, University of St. Louis 
 In “Lives in chiaroscuro: Should we suspend the puberty of children with gender identity 
disorder?” bioethicist Simona Giordano argues that gender dysphoria arises due to the experience of life 
as ambiguously gendered, that transgender children who are denied treatment are at risk for violence 
and suicide, and that puberty suppression saves lives. Given the life threatening risks of delaying 
treatment, she contends that it is unethical to deny puberty suppression for children diagnosed with 
gender dysphoria. I agree with Giordano that there are many gender nonconforming children who 
experience the intense distress that she describes. I also agree that puberty suppression offers a wide 
range of benefits and is necessary for many children. But in this paper presentation, I will argue, contra 
Giordano, it is not gender ambiguity in itself which causes distress, but the non-acceptance of a child's 
gender ambiguity which leads to the psychological pain and violence that she identifies. Following, I will 
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suggest that Giordano’s position may in fact be harmful to children given that it reinforces the root 
cause of distress which many gender nonconforming individuals experience. My intent in this paper is 
not to dismiss the importance of early medical interventions such as puberty suspension, but to 
illuminate how biases towards a dichotomous understanding of gender shapes both how gender 
nonconforming youth are represented in medical literature, and how these children are medically 
treated. 
 
 
Contextualizing the Reactions to CRISPR Following Centuries of Eugenic Medical Intervention 
 
Shawna Benston 
 Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications (ELSI) of Genetics, Columbia University 
 
 Reproductive genetic technologies (RGTs), including gene-editing technology like CRISPR/Cas9, 
are being discovered and refined at an exponential pace.  The potential uses for CRISPR are wide-ranging 
and include both therapeutic and enhancement applications, either to somatic cells or to germ cells.  
Scientific and scholarly debate has erupted over various permutations of CRISPR application, especially 
its use for “enhancement” editing of germ cells.  As these technologies continue being developed, it is 
worth investigating whether the fervidness of the ensuing debate is truly a warranted reaction to 
unprecedented innovations, or merely par for the course in the realm of medical technology. 
 
 In coining the term “eugenics,” Sir Francis Galton defined it as the science that deals with “all 
influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race” and “those that develop them to the utmost 
advantage.”  In general terms, eugenics is viewed as detrimental when technology is used to select for 
particular traits deemed “desirable” at the expense of any people who have alternative traits, and as 
beneficial when the technology is focused on elimination of agreed-upon disease.  Much opposition to 
CRISPR concerns the potential for detrimental eugenics, the slippery slope to a genetically engineered 
society favoring certain traits—intellectual, cognitive, emotional, physical, or racial—above others.  We 
must seek to balance this valid concern with a perhaps equally valid attraction to beneficial eugenics: 
the parental desire to shape their children and provide them with an open future.  As part of our 
exploration and in light of CRISPR’s limitations, we must determine whether the surge of varied 
reactions to CRISPR is in fact disproportionate to the technology’s potential promises and pitfalls. 
 
 We might view reactions to CRISPR as disproportionate when considering that this technology 
follows a long line of medical interventions designed to sustain and improve the human species.  Since 
the onset of modern medicine, our survival and success as individuals and as a society have been a 
product of technological intervention.  Whether saved from the potentially dire implications of breech 
birth, rendered disease-free by means of surgery or pharmaceuticals, or granted extended life via an 
organ transplant, human lives have been saved and prolonged by medical remedies for centuries.  Such 
interventions themselves encountered initial, and even long-running, controversial reception by the 
bioethical and lay communities, who seek to assess whether benefits outweigh potential harms or the 
production of ethical dilemmas. 
 
 This paper will explore the context of medical and technological innovation in which CRISPR has 
emerged.  When considering CRISPR’s potential application, we must work to understand what is 
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actually feasible, and to craft the continuing debate in the most productive way possible.  Can CRISPR be 
used to engineer so-called “designer babies”?  Is CRISPR more alarming than previously existing eugenics 
technologies?  Are current reactions to CRISPR really much different than were reactions to such 
previously existing eugenics technologies when they first emerged? 
 
 
Deceased Directed Donation: Considering the Ethical Permissibility in a Multi-Cultural Setting 
 
Rebecca Greenberg, Department of Bioethics and Pediatrics, University of Toronto (Canada)  
Andria Bianchi, Department of Bioethics, University of Waterloo (Canada) 
 
This paper explores the ethics of deceased directed donation (DDD) and brings a unique 
perspective to this issue – the relevance of providing family centred care and culturally sensitive care to 
deceased donors, potential recipients, and their families. As the world is becoming more diverse with 
globalization, assessing the cultural aspect of the ethics of DDD is increasingly salient. We provide a brief 
overview of DDD across the globe, 2) review prominent arguments both for and against DDD, 3) 
consider family centred and culturally-specific considerations, and 4) offer considerations for the 
development of a policy or guideline. We determine that the practice of DDD is ethically defensible in 
certain circumstances and congruent with providing both family centred and culturally sensitive care. 
Our analysis is relevant to any country with a diverse population and any health care provider or 
institution that operates under a framework of family centred care. 
 
 
Engineering Uncertainty at the Intersection of Agency, Autonomy, and Authenticity 
 
Timothy Brown and Laura Specker Sullivan 
Department of Philosophy, University of Washington 
 
Engineered devices connecting brains to computers once appeared in science fiction alone; now 
they are becoming a reality. Researchers are experimenting with increasingly complex ways of 
stimulating and communicating with the human brain: transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS), 
Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS), and Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS), among others. The medical 
applications of these technologies are diverse as well. tDCS has been used on patients with depression 
and schizophrenia; DBS is widely used for patients with Parkinson’s disease and essential tremor; and 
TMS has been tested to improve patients’ motor function and relieve neuropathic pain. For many 
patients with pharmaceutical-resistant conditions, these neurotechnological therapies are their only 
effective options. Researchers are also working on integrating these one-way stimulators with existing 
neural sensors to determine how much to stimulate and when. These bi-directional brain computer 
interfaces (BBCI) could detect when the user’s hand is tremoring or when the user is experiencing 
symptoms of depression and respond by triggering stimulation. 
 
Yet these treatments are not without side effects. As with pharmaceutical therapies, patients 
may experience changes to their energy levels, behaviors, and everyday interests. Unlike 
pharmaceuticals, patients may be unable to distinguish when the stimulator is active (and thus affecting 
their behavior) and when it is inactive. This can create a fundamental uncertainty about the source of 
the patient’s agency—is it the patient himself, or is it his TMS treatment that leads him to take time off 
work to lie in bed and watch television? Is it her DBS that makes her restless in the evening and eager to 
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buy expensive items online, or is that just a feature of her personality? Is it stress from work or the tDCS 
treatment causing her body to tense up in ways that make it hard for her to relax? Furthermore, if 
someone with a BBCI is experiencing tension in his close relationships, should he locate the source of 
this tension in himself or in the effect that the BBCI has on his behavior? Understood in relational terms, 
these technologies can affect not only an individual’s sense of self but also his or her relationships. 
One way of understanding this uncertainty is to say that people using these technologies take on new 
identities that intersect with their old identities. People using these technologies may be people with 
disabilities, people of color, research subjects, and so on, all at once. Taking on these new roles along 
with the old ones not only confuses agency, it can also frustrate autonomy and threaten authenticity as 
well. This means that in addition to complicating patients’ intersecting identities, neurotechnological 
therapies also increase the complexity of conceptual intersections in ethical analysis. Ethical assessment 
of these therapies thus requires attention to two types of intersections: among patients’ identities and 
among ethical concepts. 
 
In this presentation, we analyze how neural engineering technologies generate uncertainty for 
patients’ identities in terms of these three concepts: agency, autonomy, and authenticity. We propose 
that understanding and appraising the effects of these technologies requires sensitivity to the complex 
intersections of the user’s shifting identities and acknowledgment of the interplay of all three of the 
aforementioned concepts. Finally, we provide suggestions for making sense of these intersections. 
 
 
The Future of Psychiatric Deep Brain Stimulation: Dealing with the Unknown 
 
Laura Cabrera and Devan Stahl 
Center for Ethics and Humanities in the Life Sciences, Michigan State University 
 
Tyler Gibb 
Program in Medical Ethics, Humanities & Law 
Western Michigan University Homer Stryker M.D. School of Medicine 
 
Panel summary: In 2008, 128 patients enrolled in the Broaden Trial, a multi-center, controlled, 
doubled-blind clinical research trial that investigated the efficacy of deep brain stimulation (DBS) for 
patients with depression. Since DBS for depression is not yet approved by the Federal Drug 
Administration, it was carried through out an investigational device exemption, which allows sponsors 
to skip the standard phase I and phase II safety and efficacy trials. After only six months, however, St. 
Jude Medical, the trial sponsor and maker of the DBS implant, terminated the trial when it failed to 
reach its benchmark of a 50% response rate according to the Hamilton Depression Scale.1 Not only did 
St. Jude fail to release a public statement about the trial’s termination, but also it did not inform the 
study’s participants. Some of the participants in this multi-center study felt abandoned, with an unclear 
picture of whether or not they would receive follow-up care by the company. There are certainly many 
unknowns regarding psychiatric DBS, from whether or not its benefits are worth the risks, to whether 
more regulation is needed in order to protect study participants. 
This presentation will survey past psychosurgery practice and compare them to recent debates 
over the use of DBS for psychiatric care. Although the FDA has approved the use of DBS for Parkinson, 
                                                          
1 Danielle Egan, “Adverse Affects: The Perils of Deep Brain Stimulation for Depression” Mad in America: Science, 
Psychiatry and Community, September 24, 2015. 
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essential tremor and dystonia, DBS for psychiatric conditions, such as depression, OCD, and anorexia 
remains experimental and in the initial stages of research. Many worry that the risks for psychiatric 
patients are higher than those for movement disorder’s patients, because the areas of the brain that are 
targeted are in the cerebral cortex, which controls many essential functions of the brain as well as 
patient’s “personality.” As we look to the future of neurosurgical interventions, we must consider the 
very real ethical and regulatory challenges that remain when so little is understood about the etiology of 
psychiatric disorders and the action of mechanism controlling DBS. 
 
Selling under Uncertainty: A Prolegomena to an Account of the Morality of Selling 
 
Ryan Cobb 
Philosophy Department, University of Iowa 
 
Many of the ethical questions facing medicine concern selling.  It is at times taken as a datum  
that the sale of certain items is morally wrong, or at least deeply troubling.  For instance, the sale of 
human tissue is widely banned, and it seems that at least part of the motivation is moral (that is, not 
merely practical).  New technologies—medical and otherwise—multiply such morally sticky issues, as 
new markets and new products emerge.  So, we might wonder whether it is permissible to sell one’s 
genetic code (or portions thereof), or instructions on how to use a 3-D printer to make a gun.  Ideally, 
we would have an account of how to determine, for any combination of buyer, seller, and product, 
whether the sale is permissible.  But there are preliminary questions that we must address before giving 
any such account—or before deciding that such an account is impossible.  Failure to address these 
questions dooms us to incomplete, fragmented accounts and leaves us unprepared to address new 
questions in the ethics of selling.  It would be nice to eliminate this uncertainty, if possible.    
  
This paper addresses some of these preliminary questions.  In particular, it addresses the  
question of what constitutes a sale, and it considers what makes a sale wrong.  Thus, this paper 
functions as a prolegomena to developing accounts of the wrongness of particular types of sale. In the 
first half of the paper, I address the question of what constitutes a sale.  I then address, in the second 
half, two differing accounts of what makes selling wrong.  I consider the merits of each account, and 
conclude by reflecting on some potential future work.  
 
In the paper, I defend the following account of selling.  A seller S can be said to have sold an  
item or service I to a buyer B under the following conditions: 
 
 i) S and B agree to conditions for the transfer of ownership of I 
 ii) one of the conditions for the transfer of ownership of I is B compensating S with something 
(perhaps money, perhaps another item) of value perceived to be of roughly comparable value to I 
iii) S and B execute the conditions to which they agreed 
iv) B takes ownership of I 
 
This account, while likely “missing” some cases around the margins of selling, captures, I 
contend, some essential philosophical features of the concept.  With this preliminary account of selling 
in hand, I proceed in the second half of the paper to consider two accounts of the wrongfulness of 
selling.  These are what I shall call the “human dignity” account and the “market pressures” account. 
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Epistemology of HIV Transmission: Advancement, Uncertainty, and Dissemination of Information 
 
Lacey Davidson and Mark Satta 
Department of Philosophy, Purdue University 
 
We utilize several recent studies concerning the transmission and treatment of HIV and 
philosophical thought experiments to identify two levels of uncertainty: uncertainty in personal sexual 
health and uncertainty that leads to epistemic public health injustice. First, we highlight individuals 
engaging in sexual activity’s uncertainty regarding their sexual health and status information, and 
second, we demonstrate that uncertainties in the developing discourse around these new research 
conclusions leads to epistemic public health injustices. These injustices arise along faults of 
marginalization and privilege within and among discourse communities. We focus on communities of 
men who have sex with men (MSM) in particular. In light of these uncertainties, we must 
reconceptualize the nature of sexual education and the cultural conversation about HIV status, focusing 
on the uncertainty of transmission rates and protections, particularly as it pertains to the marginalized 
groups most affected by negative stigmas surrounding HIV. 
 
We begin our paper by presenting the recent sexual histories of a number of fictitious 
characters. We ask our audience to think about which characters are at greatest risk of seroconverting 
and which characters are dealing with the highest levels of uncertainty in terms of information about 
likelihood of infection. We engage in this in order to challenge common assumptions about where risk 
lies and to highlight often unrecognized sources of uncertainty due to deficiencies in the general public’s 
information about HIV. 
 
We next analyze recent research advancements relevant to HIV and HIV transmission risk that 
provide the evidence for our claims about sources of risk and uncertainty, highlighting some of the 
immediate epistemic upshots as we go. These findings are divided into five research themes: 1) 
estimates about the percentage of people living in the United States with HIV who do not know they 
have the disease, 2) information about the lag time between acquisition of HIV and the ability to test 
positive for HIV, 3) information about the infectivity of those in primary HIV infection and estimates 
about the percentage of new transmissions resulting from serodiscordant sex (i.e. sex in which one 
partner is HIV-positive and the other HIV-negative) in which the HIV-positive partner is in primary 
infection, 4) an explanation of what an undetectable viral load is, how such a status can be obtained, 
and what current research suggests this means for infectivity, and 5) recent advancements in HIV 
prophylaxis (i.e. preventative health measures) beyond the use of condoms. 
 
We then identify ways in which distributions of privilege and marginalization between and 
among MSM communities have led to distinct understandings and practices and some ways in which 
these understandings and practices move in the direction of rectifying or exacerbating various epistemic 
public health injustices related to HIV. We divide these epistemic public health injustices into three 
categories: 1) structural-linguistic epistemic injustices, as we will call them, resulting in widespread 
ignorance of HIV transmission risk among HIV-negative individuals, 2) hermeneutical injustices (Fricker 
2007; Mason 2011) for HIV-positive people, and 3) and credibility-deficit testimonial injustices against 
HIV-positive people, in particular black men. 
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Informational Opacity and Consent in Clinical Genomic Sequencing 
 
Michael Deem 
Department of Multidisciplinary Studies, Indiana State University 
 
Clinical expansion of whole-genome and whole-exome sequencing will compound difficulties 
involved with ensuring that patient and family decisions about clinical management are informed and 
responsible. Genomic sequencing yields an immense amount of data that must be analyzed and 
interpreted in order to provide potential benefits to clinical care. The sheer volume of raw data presents 
tremendous challenges to the effective communication of their potential clinical significance to 
clinicians and to clinical counseling. 
 
This paper discusses and clarifies three such obstacles to informed consent in genomic 
medicine, all of which involve what I call 'informational opacity' in the interpretation and transmission of 
genomic information: 
 
(a) the lack of a clinical-grade general database of identified variant-disease associations; 
(b) interpretive discrepancies in genomic analysis that undermine high-fidelity transmission 
of information about the clinical utility of sequence variants from analysts to clinicians; 
(c) varying degrees of genetic literacy among clinicians and patients affects the handling 
and communication of diagnostic information from genomic sequencing 
 
Informational opacity in genomic medicine requires a rethinking of acceptable standards of 
patient consent, especially because patients and their families are making decisions about a vast range 
of unknown analysis and health outcomes. After discussing these three forms of opacity, the paper 
develops and defends on ethical grounds a framework for communication of diagnostic information 
from genomic sequencing and acquisition of patient consent where traditional standards of informed 
consent cannot be satisfied. A new model of consent will become increasingly important as precision 
medicine advances and renders traditional models of informed consent unrealistic. 
 
 
Just Caring: Parsimonious Care in Certain Uncertain Circumstances 
 
Leonard M. Fleck 
Michigan State University 
 
Uncertainty is a Hydra-headed phenomenon in health care. From a physician’s perspective there 
often is uncertainty (many degrees) with respect to diagnosis (and the reliability of the technologies 
needed to establish a diagnosis), prognosis (and the infinite variety of genetic, physiological, 
pharmacological, behavioral, technological, economic, and cultural factors that affect the outcome of 
prognostic judgments), the appropriateness of a therapeutic intervention (perhaps related to medical 
disagreement), the likely effectiveness of a therapeutic intervention, the risk/ benefit ratio of a 
therapeutic intervention (potentially complicated by co-morbid conditions), the likelihood of a patient 
complying with the behaviors needed to maximize the likelihood of a therapeutic outcome, the 
applicability of a clinical guideline to this patient in the clinic, the reliability of the evidence and research 
behind that guideline, and, finally, the sheer randomness of natural events at various levels in the health 
care encounter. That is the background for this presentation. 
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Our question, however, is this: How should all this uncertainty be addressed in the economic/ 
political context of having to do health care rationing, and in the ethical context of having to do that 
rationing justly?  Today there is an increasing emphasis on the obligation of physicians to provide 
parsimonious care, i.e., the prudent and cost-effective use of health care resources in caring for 
individual patients.  To focus discussion I offer several common examples, such as $100,000 precision 
cancer drugs, $40,000 implantable cardiac defibrillators, PCSK9s for lowering “bad” cholesterol, access 
to ICU beds---- all of which represent uncertain benefit at very great cost.  DRGs as a hospital payment 
mechanism are part of the same problem since they can motivate “premature” discharge of a patient, 
thereby putting them at uncertain risk for an otherwise avoidable bad health outcome.  If physicians 
cooperate with the intent of DRGs (or other care protocols intended to promote parsimonious care), are 
they treating their patients unjustly?  Must physicians be virtually certain that no harm will come to 
their patients in order to be just and justified in carrying out parsimonious protocols?  “No” is the 
response I will defend.  If a patient does not have a just claim to some health care resource, then the 
harm that “might” befall them as a result of that denial is properly regarded as being unfortunate but 
not unjust. 
 
Access to health care resources is about access to a limited common good.  This is what makes 
such access a matter of justice rather than a matter of informed consent wherein a patient weighs from 
their point of view the risks and benefits (and related uncertainty) they are willing to trade off.  Matters 
of justice require social decisions.  Patients do not have a presumptive just claim to a $100,000 cancer 
drug if there is only a small chance that drug would yield an extra six months of life.  What level of 
certainty would generate such a just claim?  There is no objectively correct answer to that question.  It 
needs to be resolved, I will argue, through a process of rational democratic deliberation, the results of 
which will be just and legitimate for all in the relevant clinical circumstances. 
 
 
Preparing for the Future by Looking at the Past: The Biopolitical Fragmentation of Terri Schiavo 
 
Tyler Gibb 
Program in Medical Ethics, Humanities & Law 
Western Michigan University Homer Stryker M.D. School of Medicine 
 
It has been over a decade since Terri Schiavo died. The drama the unfolded on television screens 
and across the media between her husband, Michael Schiavo, and her parents, Robert and Mary 
Schindler, captivated millions of people all over the globe. Fifteen years before her death, Terri 
collapsed in her apartment after suffering a cardiac arrest. She suffered devastating anoxic brain injury, 
which left her in a condition known as the persistent vegetative state. Over time, her husband and 
parents, who were initially unified in a commitment to get her the best treatment available, slowly 
drifted in different directions regarding how they believe she would be wanted to be treated as her 
prognosis became more certain. The dispute between them eventually entered the court system and 
captured the attention of the national international media. Despite hundreds of newspaper and 
magazine articles, blog post, academic articles, books and countless hours of television and radio 
coverage of what has become known as the Terri Schiavo case, several important questions remain 
unanswered. Why did this case, which is widely regarded as the most intensely media-saturated end-of-
life bioethics case is history, hit the public spotlight? In a country where similar end-of-life decisions are 
made on a daily basis, what was unique about this case that propelled it into the national and 
international consciousness? Was the Schiavo case merely an anomaly, or does it represent something 
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more fundamentally problematic about medicine, the law, and our society? In this paper, using the 
Schiavo case as an analytical lens, I offer ways to address these important questions. I argue that the 
development and notoriety of the Schaivo case is due to a fundamental societal shift—what I describe 
as biopolitical fragmentation. By reinterpreting the biopolitical theory of modern philosophy since 
Foucault, I argue that the radical fragmentation seen in the Schiavo case is understandable as 
symptomatic of a societal shot in how the human body, understood in its broadest sense, is fragmented 
through the institutions of law, medicine, and society. This presentation will highlight how this analysis 
illuminates a few specific fragments in the Schiavo case—the persistent vegetative state, and the role of 
popular media. By looking carefully at the Schiavo case, future cases that challenge the foundation of 
societal assumptions about good and bad in the delivery of health care can be better anticipated and 
meaningfully engaged. 
 
 
Special Obligations and Special Biases:  
Parents as Proxies and the Release of Incidental Findings in Genetic and Genomic Research 
 
Kelsey Gipe 
Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland 
 
As technology advances in the field of genetic and genomic research and testing, ethical issues 
emerge. Particularly challenging are problems which arise from the discovery of incidental findings in 
the course of such research and testing. There is much debate concerning the consent process for 
release of incidental findings, and the question of which findings to disclose and how to obtain informed 
consent for the release of such findings is as of yet unsettled. These are problems which only intensify in 
regard to genetic and genomic research on children. In these cases, parents or guardians must act as 
proxy consenters on behalf of the child subject. In this paper I will explore the ethical issues surrounding 
parents acting as proxy consenters for their children in regard to the disclosure of incidental findings. I 
will focus specifically on unique challenges which may arise from the fact that a parent has particular 
obligations to her child which may be at odds with what the child would choose for herself were she 
capable of informed consent. When it comes to incidental findings which will likely be significant to the 
child only in adulthood, I propose a routinized opt-in system in which a child is informed upon reaching 
the age of majority of her right to inquire about incidental findings. Under the system I propose, the 
question of whether there are – for a given patient – any significant incidental findings is left open, and 
the subject is able to make the decision of whether she wants to be privy to whatever information might 
be available to her. If she opts in, then at that point she will go through the standard procedure for 
informed consent before receiving any findings. If she simply does nothing, then she will not face the 
prospect of being saddled with unwanted and potentially distressing information. In this way, the 
subject’s “Right to Know” and her “Right to Not Know” are preserved. 
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Can the Principle of Procreative Beneficence Justify the Non-Medical Use of 
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis? 
 
Biplab Halder 
Faculty of Medicine, Memorial University of Newfoundland (Canada) 
 
The Principle of Procreative Beneficence (PB) is a pronatal view in reproductive ethics which was 
originally formulated by Julian Savulescu in his paper “Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select 
the Best Children”. Further development of the principle was done in another paper titled “The Moral 
Obligation to Create Children with the Best Chance of the Best Life” in collaboration with Guy Kahane. 
The principle states that the parents have a moral obligation to select the best possible child, when 
selection is possible, by means of the genetic screening of the embryos. Preimplantation Genetic 
Diagnosis (PGD) is a reproductive technology that makes it possible to discover the medical and non-
medical genetic traits of embryos. PB justifies employing PGD not only for medical reasons, but also for 
non-medical reasons. Moral controversy arises when PGD is employed in order to select the preferred 
sex or certain genetic traits such as the intelligence of the child. The central inquiry of the paper is to 
find out whether non-medical use of PGD can be justified by PB proposed by Julian Savulescu. To 
explore this issue, I put forward the question: can PB make such a strong claim that the parents have a 
moral obligation to select the best possible child by employing PGD? In other words, what are the 
justifications of PB for claiming a moral obligation for the parents? I argue against the pro-selection view 
of Julian Savulescu exploring the basic assumptions and moral justification of PB. PB presumes that the 
non-medical and medical use of PGD are mutually inclusive in the question of a moral obligation for the 
parents. However, I show that this is not the case if we consider the possible consequences of PGD in 
the potential life of the child; the non-medical and medical use of PGD are mutually exclusive in terms of 
their implication on the child. PB also presumes a degree of parental obligation in its concept of 
‘significant moral reason’ in the case of employing PGD which is morally problematic. Finally, I argue that 
the moral foundation of PB is based on the ‘common moral intuition’ which is not an authentic source of 
a moral truth; hence, PB is not justified to claim a moral obligation for the prospective parents regarding 
the non-medical use of PGD. 
 
 
 
Public Health and Risk Prevention: The Case of Ebola 
 
Melinda Hall 
Department of Philosophy, Stetson University 
 
I investigate reactions in the United States among the public and within public health 
institutions to the 2014 Ebola Virus Disease (EVD, or Ebola) outbreak in West Africa. I approach these 
issues within the context of analyzing risk, risk aversion, and risk analysis using the 
theoretical frameworks of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. I argue that popular and public health 
responses to Ebola call us to construct ourselves as risk-averse subjects. In these various moments or 
arenas of bioethics discourses, one is encouraged to conceive of exercising one’s autonomy as a way to 
conquer chance, i.e., as a matter of risk prevention. In other words, in this setting, morally responsible 
subjects are those that attempt to manage risk through prediction and elimination, thus substituting 
choice for chance. Meanwhile, risk is conceived of as attached to particular individuals and ideas. In the 
case of prenatal testing, for example, the fetus is constructed as a vector of risk, which potential parents 
must manage. Disability, connected to the “impaired fetus,” becomes a floating signifier for risk. So, to 
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whom does the concept of risk attach in public health settings? How did the social reception and public 
management of EVD in 2014 demonstrate that the desire to eliminate the risk of infection was also a 
desire to protect oneself from chance and manage those populations believed to embody risk? 
 
I contend that an unintended consequence of public health discourse surrounding risk 
prevention in the case of EVD is the deepening construction of particular African bodies as inherently 
risky or vulnerable. Meanwhile, those in the West conceive of themselves as risk managers of these 
populations, rather than as vulnerable bodies themselves. Indeed, researchers found that stigma plays a 
role in misunderstandings with regard to the transmission and prevention of EVD (Davtyan et al. 
2014). Further, I found that in public discourse surrounding the question of Ebola, race acts as a 
key floating signifier referring to risky persons, risky traits, and the idea of risk. For example, travel bans 
applying to affected countries, including Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone, were widely called for by 
public figures and in social media. These calls and related discourse were racially inflected. United States 
President Barack Obama was accused of having special ties to West Africa which prevented him from 
seeing the need for a travel ban (e.g. Media Matters 2014). Obama rejected outright travel bans, but did 
set into place special screening procedures at airports for those traveling from affected countries into 
the US.  Some calls for travel bans and screening procedures may not be remarkable, given that viral 
infection (unlike disability) is genuinely communicable. Yet, panic over the threat of Ebola (partially 
expressed as panic over the presence, or potential presence, of West African persons and those 
resembling West Africans) vastly outstripped its potential impacts, especially when compared to far 
more widespread and also deadly viruses such as seasonal influenza. In other words, travel bans 
were not necessary and were only called for as a result of race-related panic. 
 
 
The (Un)Certainty of Care 
 
Raymond Higbeaa 
School of Public, Nonprofit and Health Administration 
 
Alyssa Luboff, Department of Philosophy 
Grand Valley State University 
 
This paper examines two kinds of uncertainty in healthcare.  One is a generic uncertainty 
present in all human endeavors, constantly increasing with the pace and intensity of our society.  The 
second kind of uncertainty is one that is presently being built into our healthcare system as we 
transition from “fee-for-service” payment models toward outcomes-based reimbursement.  These new 
models, linking payment directly to patient health and satisfaction, introduce a new layer of persistent 
and incorrigible uncertainty into the healthcare system.  No administrator or financial planner can 
predict or control the feelings and well-being of patients with as much accuracy and reliability as 
phenomena that yield “harder” data.  We will argue, however, that this second form of uncertainty, 
which seems to be more of a contingent than an inevitable feature of our healthcare system, stands not 
only to improve its overall efficiency and function, but to restore the ideal of “care” in healthcare. 
 
Current models of care delivery are structured around the certainty of payment for performing 
physician-directed activities (fee-for-service).  The new outcomes-based models, on the other hand, 
emphasize the uncertainty of uncontrolled patient activities (value-based purchasing, negative and 
positive risk sharing).  The purpose of these new models is to incent improved patient outcome and 
more efficient use of resources, based on greater coordination of care. 
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To a certain extent, the uncertainty of the new models can be managed by implementing 
control mechanisms.  The drawback, however, of such controls is that they risk recreating the same 
problems of bureaucratic excess and informational overload that they were meant to address.  We 
propose that what should be taken into account here is the greater shift reflected in the transition 
between these two kinds of models.  The old models define the healthcare system as composed of 
separate, isolated pieces to manipulate and control.  Its proper functioning, then, depends on the 
application of the proper practice heuristics, regulations, and rules.  This reflects greater certainty not 
only at the financial level, but at the ethical level as well.  Patient autonomy and respect of persons can 
be “measured” by signatures on consent forms, plans of care, and discharge instructions.  Justice can be 
demonstrated by a count of how many disenfranchised, underrepresented, or minority individuals are 
served.  The new models have the potential to define the system more holistically, as composed of 
intelligent, living pieces that work together.  Such an interpretation of the healthcare system suggests 
not only new financial and administrative measures, but an ethical shift as well, informed by the 
feminist critique of an ethic of justice and concomitant call for the development of an ethic of care.  This 
involves the infusion of relational values, such as communication, compassion, interdependence, 
attention, and context, into our current healthcare system.  While these highly qualitative values 
introduce the greater uncertainty of reduced administrative control, they stand to make the system 
itself more intelligent and responsive.  Relational values can increase the efficiency not only in the use of 
resources, but in the functioning of the resources themselves, because each piece of the system 
becomes empowered and intelligent in itself.  In this way, a relational ethic can temper the bureaucratic 
and informational excesses that remain a danger even for the new outcomes-based models.  Of course, 
adopting these new values demands a certain ethical and emotional maturity on the part of 
administrators and other large power-holders in the current system.  This process may be helped by 
seeing that such values can restore to the healthcare system not only greater efficiency but care itself, 
the well-being of patients and of all actors involved. 
 
 
Trying and Dying: Are Some Wishes at the End of Life Better? 
 
Oliver Kim 
Independent Researcher 
 
Independent In 2015, both chambers of the US Congress considered two legislative proposals 
related to care at the end of life. One proposal passed the House of Representatives as part of a larger 
package, and this proposal paralleled a “right to try” movement. The other proposal failed to be 
amended into a larger package being debated by the Senate, and this proposal would have assisted in 
advance care planning efforts with seniors. 
 
While these two pieces of legislations are unrelated, it is striking how easily the “right to try” 
passed as part of a larger bill while at the same time, a very modest proposal on the periphery of the 
“right to die” debate did not. And in state legislatures across the nation, such efforts are even more 
dramatic: “right to try” bills have passed in several states while “right to die” proposals have not seen 
even a fraction of the same success. 
 
This debate says a lot not only about our politics but also our policies around end-of-life 
decision-making. While we want a society that values life, we also want a society that empowers 
individuals to make their own decisions, particularly about their health and well-being. 
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Examining the Psychosocial and Ethical Issues Arising from the Identification, Disclosure, and 
Communication of Genomic Results to Patients and Clinicians 
 
Lan Le, Natalie Bartnik, Michele C. Gornick and Nicole Exe 
Center for Bioethics, Social Science and Medicine, University of Michigan 
 
Chair: Raymond DeVries 
Center for Bioethics, Social Science and Medicine, University of Michigan 
 
Panel summary: Precision medicine relies on genomics to customize health data and provide 
novel insights about disease mechanism, disease risks, potential responses to medication, and 
alternative treatment options.  For many patients with advanced or rare cancer, either the standard of 
care is ineffective or no standard of care therapy exists. Genomic sequencing of tumors from such 
patients could inform choices regarding clinical trials or targeted therapy based on the molecular 
characteristics of the cancer. However, little is known about how patients and clinicians will respond to 
the use of genomic sequencing in clinical oncology. 
 
The proposed panel will include findings from part of the Michigan Oncology Sequencing Center 
(MI-ONCOSEQ) research study at the University of Michigan examining the psychosocial and ethical 
issues expected to arise from the implementation of genomic sequencing into clinical care. MI-
ONCOSEQ uses integrative clinical sequencing to expansively profile genetic aberrations in both somatic 
and germline DNA of patients with rare, advanced or refractory cancers. 
 
Specifically, the panel will discuss patients’ understanding and expectations surrounding the use 
of genomic sequencing information, oncologists’ use of genomic results in clinical management, the 
delivery of genomic sequence results to oncologists, and the publics’ preferences for the return of 
secondary genomic findings. 
 
 
Quarantining an A-symptomatic Carrier: A Reasonableness Standard 
 
Christopher Marker 
Western Michigan University Cooley Law School 
 
The focus of the paper is the due process implications (both procedural and substantive) of 
quarantining an a-symptomatic carrier of an infectious disease. The paper discusses the rights of 
individuals and the ability of the government to infringe upon these rights to protect the health of the 
general public. 
 
 The paper begins with the story of Thomas Duncan, the individual who had the first confirmed 
case of Ebola that came to the United States from Africa during the 2014 outbreak. The paper then goes 
on to discuss the characteristics of Ebola and similar infectious diseases with a focus on diseases that 
have the ability to be carried by individuals without showing signs of infection, making them a-
symptomatic carriers. This is followed by a discussion concerning the history of quarantine law in the 
United States and a brief explanation of the evolution of constitutional due process. The procedural due 
process portion focuses on the fact that individuals are entitled to a trial in most instances before their 
freedom can be infringed upon. This is meant to show why it would be impractical to hold a full trial 
prior to quarantining individuals because they could potentially spread a contagious disease to 
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individuals attending the trial or other individuals in the local area. The question then becomes, How do 
you determine whether individuals have an infectious disease if they are not currently presenting any 
symptoms? The paper provides background information on substantive due process rights and how the 
government can infringe upon them because all United States citizens have the substantive due process 
right to bodily integrity (the right to determine what may enter their body and refuse medical 
treatment).  
 
Next, the paper analyzes the reasonableness procedural due process standard and how it could 
be applied to the government’s ability to quarantine an a-symptomatic carrier. The paper analyzes the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) risk factors for each known infectious disease. The 
paper then proposes that, with these risk factors as well as case precedent in other areas of law such as 
criminal procedure (exceptions to the warrant requirement), it is reasonable to conclude that the 
government has the ability to quarantine an individual based on a reasonableness standard.  
 
The paper then analyzes the substantive due process right to bodily integrity and how it applies 
to testing an a-symptomatic carrier for an infectious disease. There is case law to suggest that the 
government has the ability to compel individuals to have diagnostic tests done if they are at high risk of 
exposure to the disease based on the CDC’s risk factors. However, because this is a substantive due 
process right, the government will have to pass the strict scrutiny standard in order to infringe upon it, 
and this is very difficult.  
 
 The paper concludes that a case on point is necessary to decide whether subjecting an individual 
to medical exams without his or her consent to determine if the individual is an a-symptomatic carrier 
complies with substantive due process. However, quarantining a suspected a-symptomatic carrier of a 
contagious disease, like Thomas Duncan, without a prior hearing would likely be reasonable and 
therefore comply with procedural due process. 
 
 
The Unintended Consequences of Neurotechnological Enhancement 
 
Tabitha Moses 
School of Health Sciences, Human Services and Nursing, Lehman College, City University of New York, Bronx 
National Core for Neuroethics, Division of Neurology, Dept of Medicine, Univ of British Columbia (Canada) 
 
Over the past decade the numbers of new and innovative neurotechnologies have increased 
exponentially, and these advancements seem only to keep growing. Scientists and even DIY inventors 
have succeeded in developing devices that could enable enhanced vision, hearing, and memory in 
addition to creating a whole new range of senses. While many of these devices have been designed with 
the intention of treating disabilities or diseases, they also have the potential to enable unparalleled 
enhancement. While we have previously had access to a set of chemical enhancements, these new 
technologies will open the doors to a tremendous growth of opportunity. 
 
In spite of all the positive treatment outcomes associated with these technologies, and the possibilities 
for positive neurotechnological enhancements, there may be a darker side to them. Currently, the 
attitude of “bigger is better” is held by many who espouse the benefits of such enhancements, and 
there are certainly aspects of this approach that are irrefutably positive. However, there exists a host of 
unknown risks associated with the use of these new technologies for neuroenhancement; we are 
entering previously uncharted territory. While we have seen significantly positive effects of these 
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advances, these positives do not prevent the likelihood of future negative outcomes when we attempt 
to use these advancements in technology for enhancement rather than treatment. 
 
One major concern is whether our bodies and brains are able to cope with the additional inputs that 
may be created through the use of neurotechnological enhancing devices. It is possible to examine real 
life examples in which it appears that the individuals with a specific disorder have become overwhelmed 
in some way due to a natural neuroenhancement or alteration. Further examination of these 
pathologies (such as autism spectrum disorders, synesthesia, and hyperthymesia) will help reveal to 
what extent we should be concerned about the potential for a type of cognitive overload due to the use 
of neurotechnological enhancements. In the end, the concerns with these enhancements may not be 
based on potential internal limitations, but instead stem from the world around us and the way it may 
function to overwhelm a person should they become neuroenhanced. These technological advances 
have significant potential both in treatment and enhancement; however, it is important to be fully 
aware of the potential physiological and psychological risks of these devices. 
 
 
Author Meets the Critics: Mark Navin’s Values and Vaccine Refusal 
 
Mark Navin 
Department of Philosophy, Oakland University 
 
Mark Largent 
James Madison College of Public Affairs, Michigan State University 
 
Heidi Malm 
Department of Philosophy, Loyola University Chicago 
 
Jamie Lindemann Nelson 
Department of Philosophy, Michigan State University 
 
Panel summary: This panel focuses interdisciplinary critical attention on Mark Navin’s Values 
and Vaccine Refusal (Routledge, 2016). In this first book-length philosophical treatment of vaccine 
refusal, Navin argues that we can best understand current debates about vaccines by placing them in a 
broader narrative about medical expertise and civic engagement. Values and Vaccine Refusal focuses on 
the shifting epistemic and moral terrain surrounding an educated public’s relationship with health care 
and society – a relationship characterized by wariness of experts and elites, withdrawal from 
participation in public projects, and do-it-yourself models of reasoning and practice.  
Navin argues that some parents have good reasons not to defer to the expertise of physicians, 
and to rely instead on their own judgments about how to care for their children. Unfortunately, 
epistemic self-reliance systematically distorts beliefs in areas of inquiry in which expertise is required 
(like vaccine immunology). Navin also observes that vaccine refusers and mainstream medical 
authorities are often committed to different values surrounding health and safety. For example, while 
vaccine advocates stress that vaccines have low rates of serious complications, vaccine refusers often 
resist vaccination because it is ‘unnatural’ and because they view vaccine-preventable diseases as a 
‘natural’ part of childhood. Also, Navin argues that parents who refuse vaccines rightly resist the 
utilitarian moral arguments – ‘for the greater good’ – that vaccine advocates sometimes make. But he 
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concludes that vaccine refusers also sometimes embrace a pernicious hyper-individualism that sanctions 
free-riding on herd immunity and cultivates indifference to the interpersonal and social harms 
unvaccinated persons may cause. 
The “critics” in this session have expertise in diverse areas that are relevant to the arguments 
Navin makes.  
Mark Largent is an historian of science, technology and medicine. His research and teaching 
focus on the role of scientists and physicians in American public policy. He is the author of Vaccine: The 
Debate in Modern America (Johns Hopkins, 2012). Heidi Malm is a philosopher who specializes in ethical 
theory, bioethics and law. Her academic research focuses on ethical issues involving autonomy and the 
prevention of harm, with a current focus on issues within the field of preventive medicine and law. 
Jamie Lindemann Nelson is a philosopher who works primarily in bioethics. Much of her work brings to 
bioethical questions resources from areas of philosophy that the current discussion tends to overlook. 
She is particularly interested in philosophical issues that arise from thinking about intimate relationships 
— including families and family-like contexts. 
 
Re-thinking Mendelian Genetics: 
What are the Ethical Implications for the Use of CRISPR Together with Gene Drive in Humans? 
 
Michael W. Nestor, The Hussman Institute for Autism, Baltimore 
Richard L. Wilson, Department of Philosophy, Loyola University, and Department of Engineering 
Management, The University of Maryland, Baltimore County, Catonsville, MD 
 
CRISPR genome editing has already reinvented the direction of genetic and stem cell research. 
For more complex diseases it allows scientists to simultaneously create multiple genetic changes to a 
single cell. Technologies for correcting multiple mutations in an in vivo system are already in 
development. On the surface, the advent and use of gene editing technologies is a powerful tool to 
reduce human suffering by eradicating complex disease that has a genetic etiology. In this paper, we 
critically analyze this hypothesis from an ethical perspective by developing an anticipatory ethical 
analysis of the implications for the use of CRISPR together with gene drive in humans. 
 
Modern molecular biology techniques have allowed genetic engineering for many decades, 
however this manipulation of the genome has been limited due to lack of specificity and off-target 
effects. Recently, the advent of CRISPR gene editing techniques has been used to very precisely edit the 
genes of cells and organisms in a highly efficient manner. CRISPR can be used to edit the germline of 
embryos, implying that any corrected or introduced mutations can be subsequently passed to offspring. 
However, the limitations of Mendelian genetics prevent rapid changes in the populations of some 
CRISPR-edited organisms.  By combining CRISPR with gene drive, edited genes can be spread throughout 
an offspring population at rates significantly higher than Mendelian genetics would predict. In rapidly 
reproducing populations like insects the combination of these systems has the potential to wholesale 
change the genetic characteristics of entire populations rapidly. CRISPR and gene drive has been 
proposed to be used to induce negative ecological impacts on invasive insects or organisms, and prevent 
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the reproduction of malaria-containing mosquito populations. These uses imply that this technology can 
be easily controlled and will benefit humans. 
 
Although wholescale changes can occur in the population genetics of rapidly reproducing 
species, changes in organisms with a long life-span would take decades or centuries using CRISPR and 
gene drive. This, combined with the notion that over long periods of time natural selection may undo 
the effects of CRISPR and gene drive and artificial mate control can limit their scope, has been used as 
an argument against the effectiveness of these technologies in humans. 
 
Using an anticipatory practical ethics based on Robert Audi’s moderate intuitionism, we explore 
the implications of a CRISPR and gene drive system in humans and whether there are sufficient ethical 
concerns based on this analysis. 
 
 
Accepting Uncertainty: Applying Uncertainty as a Heuristic Tool to the Issue of 
Medical Errors 
 
Angelika Potempa 
Department of Philosophy, University of Texas-Rio Grande Valley 
 
This paper combines ideas from Ignorance Studies, nepistologies, and Object-Oriented Ontology 
and applies them to the discourse on medical errors. Known knowns and unknown knowns concerning 
certainties and uncertainties with regard to improving the quality of the health care system are 
discussed. This approach allows for discussing uncertainty as epistemological and ethical as well as 
socio-economic and political problems. 
 
 
Ethical Issues in Genome Sequencing in Research and Clinical Settings 
 
Michael Pritchard, Department of Philosophy, Western Michigan University 
Elaine Englehardt, Department of Philosophy, Utah Valley University 
 
A new generation of DNA sequencing tools has made it quite affordable to determine the 
complete sequence of a human genome.  Our presentation focuses on ethical issues regarding the use 
of these tools both in research and in clinical settings.  Some of the ethical concerns include: 1) the 
treatment of incidental findings that result from genetic testing; 2) potential conflicts of interest of 
physicians who use their patients as participants in research; and 3) communication challenges for 
researchers and clinicians who have to determine whether and how to inform participants or patients of 
findings, especially in light of difficulties researchers, clinicians, primary care physicians, participants, 
and patients may have in knowing how best to interpret the practical significance of the results. 
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In exploring these questions, we will reflect on our recent advisory role in a project proposed by 
a University of Iowa team of medical researchers specializing in the area of severe visual impairment.2  
They proposed to use exome findings from their patients in their research as well as well as to use their 
findings in providing their patients with clinical advice.  The use of the exome requires that a large 
fraction of each patient’s genomic sequence be obtained and analyzed.  However, in addition to 
uncovering information relevant to what they are looking for regarding their patients’ visual disorders, 
the researchers can expect to encounter many incidental findings—findings that are apparently 
unrelated to those original questions.  Such incidental findings will include variants of both known and 
unknown significance, information about carrier status, and information about risk for late-onset 
disorders.  In the case of an incidental finding, there are numerous ethical considerations regarding 
when (and how) a result should be presented to a research subject or a patient.  A common view is that 
individual sequence variation results should be provided to participants only in circumstances where this 
can be expected to have actual utility for them. For example, the results may suggest a preventive or 
therapeutic intervention, or the information could be used for reproductive decision-making or general 
life planning.  However, as further research is conducted, earlier research results may acquire practical 
utility that was not originally evident.  So, questions remain about the retention and possible future 
communication of data to participants. 
 
In light of uncertainties about how to proceed in such rapidly developing areas, the Presidential 
Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues’ report, Anticipate and Communicate: Ethical 
Management of Incidental and Secondary Finding in the Clinical, Research, and Direct-to-Consumer 
Contexts (Dec. 2013) offers useful ethical guidelines regarding what types of information can, should, or 
should not be offered to participants in research contexts and patients in clinical settings.   In our 
presentation we will give special attention to questions about how this information should be conveyed.   
Additionally, we will discuss difficulties in discerning participants and patients’ wishes and expectations 
regarding the return of results during the informed consent process. Finally, we will discuss problems 
that genetic counselors and geneticists face in protecting participants and patients emotionally and 
physically, as well as in ensuring their confidentiality and privacy. 
  
                                                          
2 “Exome Sequencing for Clinical Care of Vision Disorders,” proposed to NIH by Edwin M. Stone, M.D./PhD.; Val 
Sheffield, M.D./PhD.   
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Dharma Traditions and Medical Professionalism 
 
Rajiv Rangrass 
Department of Family and Community Medicine 
Western Michigan University Homer Stryker M.D. School of Medicine 
 
My talk is about the concept of Dharma as the foundation of ethical behavior. Dharma embodies 
the ethical principles for descendants of the Indus valley civilization who are not brought up following 
the Abrahamic tradition that is so common in Western society. 
 
The Abrahamic tradition gives pre-eminence to the concept of one powerful God. We recognize 
these associated faiths to be monotheistic. In contrast, within many arising traditions in the Indian 
subcontinent, the concept of Dharma, described as ‘righteous action and righteous thought’, blends 
with the idea of a personal God, or ‘Ishta-Deva’. This pluralism is often interpreted as polytheism by the 
Western mind. As an example, in Buddhism, there is not even a concept of the entity we commonly call 
God; Dharma forms the primary foundation of ethical behavior. 
 
As a physician I am very much aware of the influence of the Greek philosophical thought 
processes and their blending with the teachings from the Old and the New Testament in shaping ethical 
behavior within the medical profession in the West. 
 
While I am not a man of religion, I want to introduce the audience to the more ancient and 
universal concept of Dharma.  This concept often enables me as a physician to arrive at the same 
conclusions from the standpoint of Ethics as the home grown Westerner. However, equally often it 
allows me a fresh breath of air in the midst of an ethical dilemma where sometimes I might find my 
colleagues stuck. 
 
In this talk I share simple illustrations of these concepts and how they may be applied in daily 
medical practice to enhance professionalism. 
 
 
The Social and Ethical Aspects of Fertility Preservation 
 
Robert Rebar 
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology 
Western Michigan University, Homer Stryker M.D. School of Medicine 
 
The first birth following in vitro fertilization (IVF) and embryo transfer was less than 40 years 
ago. Yet since that time the potential uses for this technology have increased to the point that as many 
as 4% of all births in developed countries occur as a result of IVF. We now have the ability to store 
spermatozoa, oocytes, embryos, and even testicular and ovarian tissue in the frozen state for future use 
as a part of IVF with varying degrees of success. Although these technologies were originally developed 
for infertile couples, it quickly became apparent that such technologies could be marketed to single 
individuals wishing to build families, to individuals with fertility ending diseases, and to young women 
who might wish to “guarantee” their future fertility and who were not yet ready to begin a family. In 
fact, companies such as Facebook and Apple have indicated that they will pay for younger women in 
their employ to cryopreserve gametes so that they can delay childbearing. 
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These capabilities, this marketing, and these offers raise a host of ethical issues that are stirring 
debate both among the public and among professionals in the field. Despite the widespread publicity, 
very few programs have the capability of providing fertility preservation services that have a reasonable 
likelihood of ending in a pregnancy, a fact not widely appreciated by the public. Thus, we must consider 
just who is ethically qualified to offer such services. Are programs with little or no experience deluding 
themselves and their patients about their ability to provide reasonable services? Should there be 
minimum standards and experience before services for fertility preservation can be offered? As a 
corollary, should we arrange for patients who might benefit from fertility preservation to travel to the 
best clinics and sites at which to undergo these procedures? If the programs with these capabilities are 
limited, should we permit women who wish to preserve their gametes for “social” or age-related 
reasons to do so at the risk of having insufficient resources for individuals with life-threatening illnesses 
that need fertility preservation? Do we have an obligation to provide services for fertility preservation to 
all individuals with diseases such as cancer who will need treatments with a reasonable likelihood of 
diminishing future fertility? Or should such services be provided only to those who have the ability to 
pay for such services by themselves, without benefit of insurance coverage? Just what does social justice 
require? Given the limited numbers of births following fertility preservation worldwide, and the 
relatively low chances of success at this time, are we providing unreasonably optimistic expectations for 
patients? 
 
If and when the technology improves and becomes more widely available, there still will be 
other ethical issues to consider. How do we make decisions about fertility preservation for children with 
serious but potentially treatable disorders (such as leukemias and lymphomas)?  How should preserved 
gametes and gonadal tissue be handled after the death of the individual from whom they originated? 
How do we ensure that company-sponsored fertility preservation is not exploitive? Will the widespread 
availability of fertility preservation services increase women’s reproductive autonomy or merely lead to 
new and different pressures and ethical dilemmas? 
 
These issues will be addressed, but certainly not definitively answered, in this presentation. 
Fertility preservation heralds a “brave new world” that demands discussion and scrutiny. 
 
 
Development of a Psychological Framework for Patients with Chronic Pain and Depression and Its 
Impact on Ethically Appropriate Treatment 
 
Michael Redinger 
Department of Psychiatry, Program in Medical Ethics, Humanities, and Law 
Western Michigan University, Homer Stryker M.D. School of Medicine 
 
The psychological treatment of patients with chronic pain and depression has been under 
examined, despite their frequent co-occurrence in primary care and psychiatric settings and multiple 
challenges to the provision of quality care.  It is common for physicians and other health care providers 
to encounter patients who present with severe depression and/or suicidal ideation triggered by the 
frustration, and, ultimately, the despair associated with severe, unrelenting, treatment-resistant chronic 
pain.  These patients often display challenging behaviors that can frustrate and even demoralize their 
health care team and are often exacerbated by provider awareness that the common treatment 
modalities have significantly contributed to an epidemic of iatrogenic opioid addiction.  This 
combination of factors frequently disrupts the ability to form and maintain a constructive physician-
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patient relationship, which is the foundation for ethical medical care and can, in turn, further exacerbate 
the patient’s presenting complaints. 
 
The ethical provision of quality care for patients with chronic pain and comorbid depression 
would likely be benefitted by a psychological framework which acknowledges and explains the 
challenging nature of working with these patients. This paper proposes such a construct utilizing the 
work of bioethicist Carl Elliott, who argues that the secular perspective on medical care in the West 
elevates the power of the medical sciences to deity-like status.  Yet, when treatments are generally 
lacking, as in the case of chronic pain, providers inevitably find themselves incapable of meeting the 
expectations that patients’ desire.  I argue that when this occurs, patients may undergo an existential 
suffering analogous to a “crisis of faith” which can trigger the “difficult” behaviors that providers 
struggle to manage.  However, knowledge of this construct may help providers better understand the 
psychological turmoil experienced by chronic pain patients and supply a robust platform upon which a 
mental health provider could base psychotherapy.  As a result, proper utilization would help decrease 
the likelihood of rupture in the physician-patient relationship and result in higher quality and more 
ethical care.  
 
 
Sleepless Nights: The Consults that Continue to Haunt 
 
 Michael Redinger 
 Program in Medical Ethics, Humanities & Law 
Western Michigan University Homer Stryker M.D. School of Medicine 
 
Stephen Jefferson 
General Pulmonary Medicine and Critical Care Medicine, Borgess Medical Center 
 
Robert Beck 
 Pediatric Intensive Care, Bronson Methodist Hospital 
 
Chair: Tyler Gibb 
Program in Medical Ethics, Humanities & Law 
 Western Michigan University Homer Stryker M.D. School of Medicine 
 
Panel summary: Over the course of their careers, Clinical Ethicists often see similar types of 
cases, or cases with similar themes—identifying surrogate decision-makers, end-of-life decision-making, 
navigating withholding/withdrawing inappropriate medical treatment, etc. These cases can become 
somewhat routine and unmemorable. However, during a career, Ethicists generally experience a handful 
of cases are different. The reasons why any particular case sticks in the mind may vary. Sometimes 
appropriate, well-considered ethical recommendations are ignored. Sometimes the ethical analysis 
required by a case is uniquely nuanced or novel. Sometimes the emotions of a patient, the family, 
members of the healthcare team, or even the ethicist, are particularly poignant. These cases can cause 
significant emotional anguish, disquiet, may prompt introspection, reflection, and, possibly, a change in 
consultation practice, and, even years afterwards, these cases continue to haunt clinical ethicists. 
 
This panel, comprised of individuals who collectively have been engaged in clinical ethics 
consultations for many years, will each present one case that continues to haunt him or her. By 
confronting, discussing, and analyzing these difficult cases, this panel will offer reflections on difficult 
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cases and offer insights for the training of other healthcare professionals who have or will experience 
their own particularly troubling cases. This panel will also allow for significant question/answer time for 
audience discussion of additional cases. 
 
 
The Ableist Conflation: 
Empirical Folly, Inductive Risk, and Disability Bioethics 
 
Joel Michael Reynolds 
Department of Philosophy, Emory University 
 
In a 2015 article in the Boston Globe, Stephen Pinker argues, “even a one-year delay in 
implementing an effective treatment could spell death, suffering, or disability for millions of people.” 
Despite the growing number of bioethicists that address or engage disability critiques of bioethical 
positions, the ableist conflation of disability with pain, suffering, and death continues. In this paper, I 
argue that this conflation commits four errors—empirical, epistemic, conceptual, and ontological in 
nature—and I explain how these errors bear on applied debates ranging from selection criteria for IVF 
PGD to death with dignity. 
 
The first error is empirical: much social scientific literature attests to the flourishing of lives lived 
with disability. Furthermore, longitudinal studies in psychology on psycho-social adjustment suggest that 
attitudes of able-bodied people towards disability are misguided. Upon receiving a life-altering diagnosis 
or suddenly becoming disabled, a combination of ableist expectations and catastrophizing leads subjects 
to be depressed for the first six months and up to a year or two. After this time period, however, new 
normals are created and people typically report that they are flourishing, even if in a very different way 
from before. 
 
The second error is epistemic: because the relation between a given form of embodiment and 
the flourishing it will experience is largely unknowable, judgments over quality of life pose great 
inductive risk, i.e., the epistemic and non-epistemic risks of being wrong. While selection for or against 
race or gender are widely condemned, there is no widespread consensus that it is ethically wrong to 
select against Down syndrome, e.g. This is despite no evidence to suggest that people with Down 
syndrome necessarily live less flourishing lives, which renders judgments over it to have high inductive 
risk. The third error is conceptual: disability studies scholars distinguish between impairment and 
disability, healthy vs. unhealthy disability, and visible vs. invisible disability, among other designations. 
Much of the disability stigma latent in bioethical discourse trades on this lack of knowledge about and 
conceptual imprecision concerning various forms of disability. 
 
The fourth error is ontological: if disability is understood as any state outside of the healthy 
able-body, we all experience disability in infancy, via injury and illness, and, if we live long enough, 
aging. On such a definition, disability is an ontological fact about the course of life of the human 
organism. Yet, given the ADA, disability is also a legally protected minority in the United States of 
America. Also, many of its forms are distinct cultures, as with Deaf culture or some who identify as 
Neurodiverse. Conflating disability with pain, suffering, or death ignores the different meanings of 
disability and the multiple ontological registers on which it operates. In doing so, the ableist conflation 
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hinders bioethical debates by promoting empirical folly, indefensible inductive risk, conceptual 
confusion, and ontological oversight. It perpetuates the historical denigration of disability and 
exacerbates genuine issues of uncertainty with respect to disability and bioethical concerns. 
 
 
PARADIGM SHIFT:  How the Opioid Epidemic is Driving Change in Perception, Treatment & the Law 
 
Lauren Rousseau 
Western Michigan University Cooley Law School 
 
 In December 2015, the federal Center for Disease Control released new numbers concerning 
drug poisoning fatalities in the United States.  Drug overdose deaths have again surged, from 43,982 in 
2013 to 47,055 last year, which means that every day, nearly 129 people die from drug overdose.  Drug 
overdose deaths have almost tripled since 1999, and more than half of the 2014 overdose fatalities were 
due to opioid medications and heroin. 
 
 This presentation explores the reasons behind our nation’s current drug epidemic, as well as 
how that epidemic is driving change in policy, addiction treatment, and the law.  One driver of the 
exponential increase in opioid and heroin use has been the systematic overprescribing of opioid 
medications by physicians during the past decade.  The Substance Abuse & Mental Health Services 
Administration recently reported that four out of five heroin users begin with abuse of prescription 
opioid medications. 
 
Historically, our country has viewed addiction as a moral failing warranting criminal  
sanctions, rather than as a health issue requiring treatment.  This is true despite the fact that the 
medical community has recognized addiction as a brain disease for decades.  Until recently, our 
approach to drug abuse and addiction has centered on criminalization and incarceration.  Over 50% of 
those incarcerated in our federal prisons are there due to drug-related offenses, yet for the most part, 
our jails and prisons do not offer addiction treatment.   Moreover, the criminal record a person carries 
upon release from prison creates barriers to recovery from addiction. 
 
 The current drug epidemic is driving public policy and perception away from the “addiction as 
moral failing” paradigm, and towards an “addiction as disease warranting treatment” paradigm.  This 
shift in thinking is demonstrated in many ways, including by the increased availability of health 
insurance coverage for addiction treatment, increased access to medications that reverse drug overdose 
and help stabilize recovery, and changes within the criminal justice system to direct persons struggling 
with addictions to treatment rather than jail. 
 
 A number of ethical issues are raised by some of these changes.  For example, to what extent 
might the availability of medications that reverse drug overdose and changes in the criminal justice 
system encourage continued drug use?  To what extent might medication-assisted treatments actually 
perpetuate addiction, rather than support recovery? 
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   In addition to the above issues, two controversial ideas that have been less widely embraced 
deserve mention – needle exchanges and safe injection sites, both of which focus on harm reduction 
rather than treatment.  Lastly, Portugal’s approach to its own addiction crisis is instructive.  In 2001, 
Portugal decriminalized all drug use and possession, and focused its resources on addiction treatment, 
with encouraging results.  
 
Addiction has become a public health crisis in this country that can no longer be ignored.   
Solving the problem requires a paradigm shift in perception, treatment, and the law, driven by 
recognition that addiction is a disease, and not a crime. 
 
 
This Medication May Kill You: Cognitive Overload and Mandated Informed Consent 
 
Devin Schindler and Tracey Brame 
Western Michigan University Cooley Law School 
 
The Federal Government requires pharmaceutical manufacturers to provide prospective 
customers with an extraordinary amount of information.  Justified under the doctrine of informed 
consent, the Food and Drug Administration has imposed comprehensive guidelines that regulate 
virtually every aspect of how medications can be marketed.  Similar obligations are imposed on 
physicians involved in biomedical research. 
 
Although informed consent is a cornerstone to the ethical practice of medicine, recent studies 
employing fMRI technology suggest that mandated disclosure of “too much” information can result in 
cognitive overload and irrational decision making.  The paradoxical effect of the mandated disclosure 
requirements is that they likely lead to patients choosing to not take beneficial medications.  This 
paradoxical effect arises from three well-studied psychological phenomena:  (1) “Recency-Primacy, (2) 
“Satisficing” and “Probability Neglect.”  The combination of these three effects in patients who have 
been inundated with excessive information results in decision making based on anecdote and emotion, 
instead of logic. Studies also suggest that most people are extraordinarily bad in assessing risk, 
particularly when an activity poses an infinitesimal but highly consequential risk. In plain language, 
people overreact to miniscule risk.  Hence, when the government requires pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to disclose in advertisements such risks, the effect is for patients to err on the wrong 
side; i.e. not taking medication that could provide great benefit. 
 
Government-mandated messages also raise serious First Amendment concerns. Government 
action that compels physicians and pharmaceutical companies to convey mandated messages sits at the 
crossroads of two divergent legal doctrines.  Compelled speech of “political” messages are strongly 
disfavored under the First Amendment.  Regulation of commercial speech, however, is generally subject 
to a lower level of scrutiny.  These two doctrines, one focused on laws compelling speech and the other 
on laws which restrict speech, conflict in situations where the government imposes informed consent 
requirements which are contrary to the speaker’s favored message. 
 
This multidisciplinary study combines case law, the philosophical underpinnings of the First 
Amendment, political theory, and emerging research into how the brain organizes and manages 
information to come to the conclusion that many of the rules imposed by the government to insure 
informed consent are counterproductive and likely unconstitutional. 
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This presentation is adopted from an article previously published by the authors in the Whittier 
Law Review entitled “This Medication may Kill You:  Cognitive Overload and Forced Commercial 
Speech,” 35 Whittier Law Review 1. 
 
 
Anticipating Future Effects:  
The Role of the Doctrine of Double Effect in Medical Care and Research 
 
“The Doctrine of Double Effect in End-of-Life Decisions,” 
Adam Shatsky 
Department of Philosophy, Kent State University 
 
“Research on Children, Placebos, and the Doctrine of Double Effect,” 
Jeffrey Byrnes 
Department of Philosophy, Grand Valley State University 
 
Panel summary: When faced with an unknown future, physicians, researchers, and regulatory 
bodies are often ethically compelled to reconcile their intentions with a variety of anticipated 
consequences and numerous possibilities. This is familiar territory to the ethicist acquainted with the 
Doctrine of Double Effect. Philippa Foot (1967) introduced what is typically regarded as the most 
influential version of the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE). As she writes, “By DDE I mean the thesis that 
it is sometimes permissible to bring about by oblique intentions what one may not directly intend.” 
Foot’s intention was to bring to fore the moral distinctions between intended and unintended 
consequences, and between positive and negative duties––that is, the duty to render aid weighed 
against the duty not to inflict harm.  
 
The implications of Foot’s work sparked a debate not only in moral psychology, but also in 
applied philosophy, particularly in healthcare ethics. Those who invoke some variant of DDE (in the 
medical field) raise interesting questions as to both the nature of physician-patient relationships and the 
relation of researcher to subject. As we shall discuss, these questions seem to arise because who invoke 
DDE often do so from a very specific picture of what those relationships should be. Our papers examine 
the occurrence of DDE in clinical, specifically palliative, care and in medical research, offering a critique 
to each. In so doing, we recognize the explanatory power of DDE, but are suspicious of its normative 
value in matters of health care. 
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The Google of Personalized Healthcare: 23andMe and Enabling the Privatization of Genetic Biobanking 
 
Kayte Spector-Bagdady 
Center for Bioethics and Social Sciences in Medicine, University of Michigan 
 
 23andMe is back on the market as the first direct-to-consumer genetic testing company that 
“includes reports that meet [Food and Drug Administration] FDA standards for being clinically and 
scientifically valid.” Its current product includes 36 health-related carrier-status reports and consumers’ 
raw genetic data (in addition to ancestry and other non-medical information). Forbes reports recent 
investors estimate its value at $1.1 billion. But that valuation is not on the basis of 23andMe’s $200 test 
kits. While its frontend product is selling individual genetic tests online, its back-end business model is 
amassing one of the largest privately owned genetic databases in the world. 23andMe offers an 
inexpensive product to consumers (personalized genetic analysis) to generate broader consumer data, 
and then leverages that data to generate profit becoming—as board member Patrick Chung put it—“the 
Google of personalized health care.” And it recently surpassed its goal of 1 million consumers. While the 
focus of the debate surrounding direct-to-consumer genetic testing has been on whether FDA regulation 
is necessary to protect consumers receiving potentially sensitive medical information without a 
physician intermediary, the more important question moving forward will be how to regulate use of 
consumer data. 
 
 Private control over genetic databanks has important implications for public health and genetic 
epidemiology. While some argue that commercial interest and funding is critical to encourage 
innovation of therapies, others point out that it is only through open access that researchers can work 
with the breadth of data needed to make advancements in the field—as well as verify the results of 
others’ research. Genetic epidemiology can contribute to preventative public health measures by, for 
example, isolating environmental versus genetic risk factors. But access to a large dataset is required to 
do this research, with some hypothesizing that a cohort would need at least 500,000 participants.  
Research of isolated families at risk for genetic disease has met with less success than largescale 
genome-wide association studies that require data across a large population. President Obama’s new 
Precision Medicine Initiative biobank is founded on the concept of the centralization of already existing 
research and data. While the goal of the Precision Medicine initiative is individualized clinical care, the 
process requires public health research and analysis. But the privatization of a large cohort of genetic 
data tied with epidemiological factors can stagnate the advancement of such research and possibly the 
field of personalized medicine itself. 
 
As HHS revises our decades-old human subjects research structure, it is necessary to consider a 
cohesive approach to regulating private genetic databanks. This strategy should allow FDA and other 
department agencies to play a role in expanding current regulatory coverage. Approaching data- and 
bio-banks as assets that are as vulnerable and valuable as the individual datum that creates them will be 
critical, as we increasingly rely on their use, to both ensuring that federal funding continues to be the 
gold-standard research resource and that as much research is covered by federal protection as possible. 
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Ethical Communication in Human-Subjects Research: 
Creating an Informed Consent That Effectively Communicates Risk and Promotes Personal Autonomy 
 
Chris Trudeau 
Western Michigan University Cooley Law School 
One of the main purposes of the Federal regulations regarding human-subjects research and the 
recently released Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that seeks to update these Federal regulations 
is to enhance the protection for those individuals who contribute their time and assume risk to advance 
the research enterprise, which benefits society at large. As such, the primary goal of human-subjects 
research is not to aid the specific person treated – it is to advance scientific research for society’s gain, 
not the specific individual’s (as the NPRM, itself, suggests). Because individual participant interests 
aren’t the primary focus of research trials, there are unique ethical implications that researchers and 
their legal counsel must consider regarding the method and manner in which they communicate with 
these participants. In fact, one of the goals of the NPRM is to “increase human subjects’ ability and 
opportunity to make informed decisions . . . .” 
This session will address two of the challenges of communicating the required disclosures under 
the current and proposed federal regulations – the method and manner of presenting the 15-18 
disclosures to research participants. Specifically, this paper will propose regulating the informed consent 
process – rather than just the form – and it will discuss creating a functional risk hierarchy of the 
mandated disclosures under Federal law. In the end, these two changes should dramatically improve 
participant understanding of the risks and benefits of engaging in a research trial.  
 
Ethical Omission and Aspect-Blindness 
William Vaughan 
Department of Philosophy, Ashland University 
 
The theme of this conference is Bioethics: Preparing for the Unknown. Yet the title confronts us 
with the age-old problem of how is it possible to prepare for something about which little is known. This 
paper seeks to explore some of the deepest unknowns in medical ethics, the issues of ethical omission 
and aspect blindness.  The problem of ethical omission is in regard to how to classify the morality of non-
actions, or the omission of acts. The problem of aspect-blindness is when people (in medical contexts) 
seemingly lose, or have revealed to be totally lacking in, their most basic ethical concepts, such as in the 
recognition of another human being in affliction. The paper tries to make sense of these circumstances. 
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Minors and Health Care 
 
Hollian Willekes 
Western Michigan University Cooley Law School 
This paper gives an overview of what minors’ rights are when it comes to their health care and 
treatment. Additionally it details several unique ethical and legal situations that providers may face 
when treating minors. 
Michigan recognizes the common-law right to be free from non-consensual physical invasions 
and the doctrine of informed consent and its corollary, the right not to consent. In the case of minors, 
who are generally considered legally incompetent to consent to medical treatment, parents generally 
have the right to consent to medical treatment or refuse medical treatment for their children. There are 
situations, however, when parents might not have an absolute right to consent to care for their child, 
and health care providers are confronted with the question of what to do. Sometimes what the parent 
wants for their child is not in their child’s best interest. At other times the minor may be allowed to 
consent to a specific treatment without parental consent, or even without parental knowledge of the 
treatment.  Adolescents in particular have several exceptions to the general law that parental consent is 
necessary for medical treatment to minors. Providers routinely face legal and ethical issue which may 
interfere with the provider’s ability to deliver care to a minor patient. 
Sections of this paper include parental rights, non-parent decision makers, minor consent laws, 
and access and disclosure of medical information and medical records. The importance of gaining 
parental consent, while at the same time ensuring minors’ rights and wellbeing, is discussed in the 
context of health care situations that providers often find themselves in. 
  
Abstracts are listed alphabetically by last name of first author or panelist 
33 
 
BCIs and Robotics: An Anticipatory Ethical Analysis 
Richard Wilson 
Department of Philosophy, Loyola University Maryland 
Robotics research is merging with the latest medical technology to create a new generation of 
prosthetic feet, legs, hands, and arms to give users a more natural feel and capability. Developments 
began with comparatively simple microchip-controlled actions, then processors that translate muscle 
movements into prosthetic responses and clinical trials on controlling prosthetic movements through 
computer-interpreted brain waves. As these developments push the human-mechanical interface 
further along, the ultimate result-one seen as achievable, at least in part, during this decade-is a form of 
symbiosis. "In some discussions with the international standard-setting body for prosthetics, there is talk 
of no longer speaking of prosthetic arms but of wearable robotic devices because today's prosthetics are 
increasingly more robotic," says Dr. Robert Jaeger, director of deployment health research in the 
Veterans Health Administration (VHA) Office of Research & Development. "The biggest breakthrough for 
arms is the brain-computer interface. The dream of upper extremity prosthetic researchers is acquiring 
signals directly from that part of the brain that controls the arm and processing those with a computer, 
so the person using the arm doesn't have to do a lot of conscious movements. Instead, the prosthetic 
reacts to them simply thinking about a movement. It's still a long way off, but there could be a 
breakthrough at any time and certainly is an area the VA, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and 
NIH are looking at for potential breakthroughs" 
This analysis will focus on the current state of prosthetics, BCI’s (Brain Computer Interfaces) and 
robotics for members of the military and members of society while performing an anticipatory ethical 
analysis of expected developments in the same areas. 
 
 
